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REPLY TO D E F E N D A N T S ASSERTIONS
A. Interpretation of the requiremen;
of law, not of fact
A£,ev'

p

i

jbinson / s preliminary hearing testimony included two hearsay

statements. The first hearsay statement — that Officer Wolcott"
the slit [in a ceiling tarp inside Dek-ndunt s >:.L-J lesi^ei;. •; ,
paraphernalia and a sma;, i'.\i:\i\- • - ' •- ~;- ;:••• •
adn*iiroi::\i*j. ^a

.•

•

:"- ^.-v'-- 4' ?i/. "

i-iri*1. -

\ ;

'• - • * • -• -ned reliable and
' '.rent Robinson did rut witness

Officer \W>!u»ff • discovery el :he paraphernalia or small baggie and did not

identify which of his fellow officers told him of the discovery. See id. Nevertheless,
the magistrate concluded that the out-of-court statement constituted reliable hearsay
under rule 1102(b)(6), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, because the agent specifically
named Officer Wolcott. See id.
The magistrate reached the opposite conclusion in relation to the second
hearsay statement. See State Br. at 3-5, 7-8, & 15-16. Agent Robinson testified that
after the paraphernalia and small baggie were discovered, Officers Barker and
Wolcott continued to search the shed, while the agent and Defendant stood just
outside the shed's door (R40: 7-8). The agent explained, "[Tjhere was also an engine
part, a carburetor actually laying right next to the bed" that the agent had
previously observed when he was inside the shed (R40: 8 & 13). The agent
continued, "[T]he carburetor was taken apart, and inside, a piece of the carburetor
was another baggie, a pink, reddish colored baggie . . . that also had a crystalline
substance in it" (R40: 8). The agent stated that "the officers" told him that the large
baggie was found inside the carburetor and, when they exited the shed, showed him
all the items seized they had seized (R40: 8 & 12-15). The agent then watched as
Officer Barker field-tested the contents of the large and small baggies (R40:8-9). The
magistrate concluded that the hearsay statement concerning the discovery of the
large baggie was inadmissible under rule 1102(b)(6), because Agent Robinson did
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not personally observe the search or precise!v identic

r -: :r <

discovered the baggie or informed hi nu-; iis L;-SC>. •
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^.-'ViV statements is ihat

Agent Kohiiisou spivifii/alh n.imi'J ()fficorWolcott in the first instance, but referred
I^ - i »f t ncrs \\ oli o11 .tnd Barker collectively and generically as "the officers'7 in the
second. Ihe magistrate found this distinction material under his interpretation of
the requirements of rule 1102(b)(6). State Br., Atm

.

. : \ u u , i ; . - r -.: ;:

.;.';,

characterized that ruline
^r. at 2.
. M.^.K!."*'
• «• * * \
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• • -lie correct standard of review. He concedes that

a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying peace officer' qualifies

as reliable hearsay under rule 1102/' but < laims that:- n~t the issue in tiii^ cu.^-c.
Br. at 8. Instead, he asserts that the issue to be auU I :UU.-. ^; ;.• [ \ ( A
fact: Whether the information contain- .;

•

^
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- - ^Vvrcame

from a non- testj I \ n ig OJ i it e J . ' f' > / I )ef< Mid a n 1 f i i rtiic »r asserts that because the issue is
fuel

* -nagistrate's ruling is entitled to deference. Dq/1 B/'. at 1 <fc T'-S.
Defendant is incorrect. It is undisputed that the only persons at the scene

were Defendant, Agent Robinson, and O u i - is . ^ I M
Consequently tho onlv possible source of inc -:a;-. UK.
was ehher LV-K'n^,-...---". .. • •
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Agent Robinson's fellow officers. As Defendant admits, this evidence supports a
reasonable inference that "the officers" Agent Robinson referred to were Officers
Barker, Wolcott, or Nielsen. See Def. Br. at 13.
But Agent Robinson's testimony went beyond this inference. He testified that
he was Defendant's probation officer and asked the other officers to assist him in
conducting a probation search of a small cluttered shed Defendant solely occupied.
See State Br. at 3-4 & 6-7. Agent Robinson stated that Deputy Nielsen's only role was
to conduct canine sweeps of the shed, after which Officers Barker and Wolcott
physically searched the shed, while Agent Robinson and Defendant stood just
outside the shed's entrance. Id. at 6-8. After Officer Wolcott discovered the
paraphernalia and small baggie in the ceiling tarp, Officers Wolcott and Barker
continued to search. Id. at 8. When Officers Wolcott and Barker completed their
search and exited the shed, they showed the small baggie, paraphernalia, and large
baggie to Agent Robinson and "the officers" described the discovery of the large
baggie inside the carburetor. Id. at 8 & 15-16. Agent Robinson then watched Officer
Barker field-test the contents of both baggies. Id. In sum, the evidence and its
reasonable inferences establish that Officers Barker and Wolcott acted in concert:
they searched in tandem, discovered the large baggie in tandem, and showed it to
Agent Robinson in tandem. Under these circumstances, any factual distinction
concerning which officer physically seized the baggie or described its location to
4

Agent Robinson N -f no kv-.il consequence to the statement's it'JiabiliU and
admissibility. See also State Br. at 11-18.
Moreover, contrary m ueiem;,mi - ,i->>*''VV r • -• / \-< or. at 13, the magistrate
did not rule thai the second hearsay statement was inadmissible because the
••.-•••

- ;--^ o r i e n t Lo establish that an officer made it

The magistrate

accepted that "some officer'' at the scene made the statement. See >taie o/•.,. -^. d.
The magistrate opined, however, that to be admissible emoei :

1 -••'-'

:•*

out-of-court statement must be "a specific Jeelarath HI »»t m nun teslitYing officer'7
and not merely "vague, ui \>\-> ;; v " ;:.: from on - •.»< -^ .

* *!'• ;c- -r -

'^

-

• •;. -; \ ^ont Robinson "obtained ...

re there and found what was then field tested/'

. -r - • '•. 1-* da according to the magistrate, a statement of a fellow officer does
not Ldii vviihin rule 1102(b)(6), unless it is identified as a specific quote from a
specific officer.
In sum, the issue on appeai >; \. :>. i.>-• -

o - r '•> '•• im--pretation of the

rule is correct. I hat issue is one of law, i tot of fact. See State v. Tiliaia, 2006 UT App
474, Ij Id, 133 r \] 757 (recognizing that "standard of review on the admissibility of
hearsay evidence is complex, since the determination of admissibility 'often contains
a number of rulings, each of which may require a different stand J iu ot re. leva " -~d
concluding that "[qjuestions oi law within the determination ol adniL^dhilitv are
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reviewed for correctness") (quoting State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 10,122 P.3d 639)
(other citation omitted).
B.

Rule 1102(b)(6), the fellow officer or collective knowledge rule,
does noi require a testifying officer to precisely identify which
officer said or did what in the course of a multi-officer search.
Both parties agree that rule 1102(b)(6) embodies the "fellow officer" or

"collective knowledge" rule. See State Br. at 12; Def Br. at 8 & 14. As discussed in
the State's opening brief, that rule presumes that statements of fellow officers are
reliable and may be collectively considered in determining probable cause, even if
the hearsay statements would not be admissible at trial. See State Br. at 12-14.
The parties disagree, however, on the legal requirements of rule 1102(b)(6).
Defendant claims that the rule requires the testifying officer to precisely identify
which fellow officer said or did what.

See Def. Br. at 12-13.

Consequently,

Defendant argues that, in this case, the magistrate properly excluded the second
hearsay statement because Agent Robinson did "not identify which officer told him
what, nor ... indicate which officer searched the carburetor and found the baggie."
Def. Br. at 12. Neither the fellow officer rule nor rule 1102(b)(6) require such
specificity.
Instead, both rules require only that an officer make a statement that is
communicated — directly or indirectly — to a fellow officer. See State's Br. at 13.
Here, as more fully discussed in the State's opening brief at 6-9 & 14-18, the
6

preliminary hearing evidence clearly establishes tiua the seana
field-testing of the large baggie occurred at tlle s=.» i v •.:./ * :; , ^
the four officers were pre-'am

. :scv\ *r
;

; vi'.Mv !cim aiid

; --.;-.-* ! mt ":* i::- 'Kit irom this evidence, die

magistrate "uuJd (iav-« inferred" that Officers Barker, Wolcott and/c-» Deputy
\:vK'-r t --•'• •')'- : \gent Robinson of the discovery of the large baggie.

But

Defendant claims, the magistrate was not obligated to make this inference. Def Br,
at 13. That is incorrect. Under governing legal s U n u ^ r ^ , a a i a g i s a ^ i- . .: ~\.aa -d
to view preliminary hearing evidence and its RMMM labia inl<MVHO ^ " i n a li.^ht most
favorable io me :^\^t\ e ?^. • .

- - -

'.••

*

7/no\ flDOh 111 App 232, H 3 n.3,138 P.3d

'av Br. at 19. Because Defendant fails to acknowledge

these standards, his argument lacks merit. And because the magistrate refused to
apply these standards, his ruling is erroneous.
Defendant also asserts that the rotate mav not areup ,,::.;, v^i •; . :~\ • A ruial
admissibility of the hearsay statement a .; - > r e ' i• • r - a: - -

: • - -a • - .'. • 1102, because

the btate did nel make this argument below. Def. Br. at 15-22. Defendant is, of
course, correct that an appellant may not raise an unpreserved claim for the first
time on appeal. See State v. Patrick, 2009 UT App 226, ^f 12, 217 P . \ i I i a •' i ne :r:aie,
however, is not claiming that the Court should reverse the mam-;;va.' - ; ming
because the second hearsay statement is admis> a M«. . .-• rn^aw
1102.

Discussion i : m

_. • -

; ^m^..;
7

:
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'oi rule

. a monstrates only Liat the

magistrate erred in believing that subsection (b)(6) requires greater specificity and
reliability than other subsections of the same rule. See State's Br. at 10 & 17-18.
C.

Even if the hearsay is not considered, the remaining evidence
establishes probable cause for bindover.
The magistrate made inconsistent evidentiary rulings regarding two similar

hearsay statements. See supra at 1-3. The magistrate ruled that the first statement
concerning Officer Wolcott's discovery of the paraphernalia and small baggie was
admissible and considered it in determining probable cause. See id. The magistrate
ruled that the second statement concerning the discovery of the large baggie was
inadmissible and refused to consider it in determining probable cause. Id.
In its opening brief, the State argued that even if the second hearsay statement
were excluded, the remaining preliminary hearing evidence establishes probable
cause to bind over Defendant.

See State Br. at 19-22. Defendant claims the

remaining evidence is insufficient. See Def. Br. at 22-24. Defendant is incorrect.
Contrary to Defendant's assertion, see Def. Br. at 23, Agent Robinson's
personal knowledge was not simply that he "was present when a field test was
conducted/ 7 The evidence establishes that Agent Robinson supervised Defendant
who was on probation. The agent went to Defendant's residence —a small shed
adjacent to his mother's mobile home —to conduct a probation search. The agent
asked Officers Wolcott and Barker to assist him. When the three arrived at the shed,

8

the agent knocked and Defendant answered. No one eN_ v- ^
time and the a cent knew ir.^i ; VKTIC^M

, • •;

inside ar,J orserxeu c, -^;. _..i ;o> -

]

• .;•:

• ••••^•ri--'

'

v

. ;

^

>.*;..."

-

- > a^viu v\ ciit

^lonaciiu's bed. Due to the ^lutkr- d

, ,^;-;i! requested canine assistance. Canine Officer

Nielsen responded with his dog. The agent then directed Deputy Nielsen to
conduct a canine sweep of the shed's interior. The agent also ci;:*,\ ;CJ, L'^'K- IS
Wolcott and Barker to conduct a physical search v.: i: ie si !•. M ,:: ;< -i • r •, J : ; f.»» - * p.
The agent stood i... n outsiae :ne -ir J' • «'n!v. ^ - . , - "*•* search. Upon the
officers' •„ \;i, U •. . v . . I

•

:

: •, \

•,• ->. - -.v\] them holding the drnr paraphernalia,

sma 11 baggie of crystalline residue, and large baggie of crystalline p< MV der. Based on
hi is experience,

the

agent

recognized

these items

as likely

containing

methamphetamine. And based on his experience, the agent observed .in- .; n \;.a1 e
field-test that confirmed that the items con ta mi.; in ;,r .u : > \ : v , .
6-9 & 20-21. As discusse.. . .• •..••• - ./
oi?sei\ .J.:-.*:.-

* r* '"i-v . *-. 4

-.v -/-.•/•'•'-'* ^t

^ v:u Robinson's own

i .n.-^. •••A---1 -npp^ii probable cause to believe that Defendant

possessed methamphetamine. See State Br. at 19-22.
Defendant's analysis of the evidence also fails because he— like the
magistrate — impermissibly fails to view the evidence MYJ V -> i <: j-nr\AA^ * A: -'••••>ces
in the light most favorable ;\; me piv-e* t i--.,
and cases cited ;n n; ;; /«<

—'

A • •* ?*-^

'' \ r p i 3 2 , *;! 3n.3,

•* • *A An, -> is viewed under the governing
9

standard, its sufficiency is evident. See State Br. at 19-22 (discussing sufficiency of
evidence independent of hearsay).
D. Rule 1102(c) favors a continuance when, as here, "the magistrate
finds that hearsay evidence .. . admitted is not sufficient and
additional evidence is necessary for a bindover."
In its opening brief, the State argued that the magistrate abused his discretion
in refusing to continue the preliminary hearing. See State Br. at 20-21. Defendant
claims the refusal was warranted.

See Def. Br. at 24-26. Again, Defendant's

argument lacks merit.
The decision to grant a continuance is discretionary, however, rule 1102(c)
favors a continuance when "[t]he magistrate finds that the hearsay evidence
proffered or admitted is not sufficient and additional evidence is necessary for
bindover/ 7 See State Br. at 20 & State's Add. A.
This is the circumstance here. Though Defendant claims otherwise, see Def.
Br. at 24-25, the prosecutor reasonably relied on the plain language of rule 1102(b)(6)
in believing that Agent Robinson could testify to what he observed as well as to
what officers under his direction reported to him. See State Br. at 11-18. The
prosecutor also reasonably believed that the hearsay statement concerning the large
baggie was admissible, given that Defendant did not object when the agent testified.
See id. at 4 & 20-21. Only after both parties rested, did Defendant claim that the
evidence was insufficient for bindover. The magistrate then ruled that the second
10

statement constituted inadmissible hearsay and refuse,

•: ,-

determining probable cause. See id, 11le prosecutor '^ ^ - -\\\%b\

uniinuance to

produce tl le other officers.
I Ji icier tliese circumstances, even if exclusion of the hearsay statement were
, . ..... :

i-iitiiiuance was still justified.

The prosecutor relied on the plain

language of an evidentiary rule in presenting her evidence. When te,,:
was ruled inadmissible and insufficient, the prosecutoi o!ie:vdh»; e>ee -M *- ;! r
officers, if a continuance was gram-.v.
would not havp „e^:.. . . ; - ; :

•

..

^

• •

• --vc lor this purpose

- x ^ e - e Yet, a denial of a continuance

w\*\:.\'.- ...iw ,.-,: --*.' ^v-' : \.M\ prejudice the prosecution by derailing a legitimate
feloty. prosecution.

See State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188, 11SQ (Utah A - ; > M S :

(recognizing that court abuses its discretion when its actions are .: .r.^: e;. ^ .
and that "[sjociety has [an] interest r.\ trie vinei....^
citations and internal quote;]v ;i ,.-\e
'

. ;e.v:. ... • .-:

••

,:

--

e e:>"^.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in the State's opening brief and te;> • pi, orivi iv\e
Court should reverse the evidentiary ruling and refusal io bindi »\ ei, reinstate Hie

11

dismissed information, and order the case to proceed to trial.
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of December, 2009.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General
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CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellant
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